NFPA 101

NIST WTC Recommendations 21-24 > Improved Firefighting

Previous Posts in This Series …

2011-10-25:  NIST’s Recommendations on the 9-11 WTC Building Collapses … GROUP 1. Increased Structural Integrity – Recommendations 1, 2 & 3 (out of 30)

2011-11-18:  NIST WTC Recommendations 4-7 > Structural Fire EnduranceGROUP 2.  Enhanced Fire Endurance of Structures – Recommendations 4, 5, 6 & 7

2011-11-24:  NIST WTC Recommendations 8-11 > New Design of StructuresGROUP 3.  New Methods for Fire Resisting Design of Structures – Recommendations 8, 9, 10 & 11

2011-11-25:  NIST WTC Recommendations 12-15 > Improved Active ProtectionGROUP 4.  Improved Active Fire Protection – Recommendations 12, 13, 14 & 15

2011-11-30:  NIST Recommendations 16-20 > Improved People EvacuationGROUP 5.  Improved Building Evacuation – Recommendations 16, 17, 18, 19 & 20

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2011-12-04:  SOME PRELIMINARY COMMENTS …

  1.     Such is the pervasively high level of both direct and indirect fire losses, not all of which have yet been identified … that a force of committed firefighters, having sufficient numbers and properly trained and equipped, is a valuable social asset in any community … and one not to be weakened or diluted easily.

  2.     Lack of discipline among firefighters was an issue during the day of 9-11 (11th September 2011) in New York …

In real life or death situations, however, discipline is essential … but competent and efficient command, control and co-ordination … facilitated by reliable systems of communication (human and electronic) … are critical.

And accurate, real time information about what is happening at a building fire incident of whatever scale … i.e. situation awareness … is a tool which propels forward and encourages the effective functioning of both the firefighter and the user/occupant evacuating the building.

  3.     A serious gap, internationally … a deep cavern … in the awareness, training and education of firefighters at all levels … is the issue of ‘disability’ and the varying range of abilities in a typical building user/occupant profile.

It is not fully appreciated by firefighters that certain people may die if placed in a standard fireman’s lift position … or, if shouted and screamed at, many people may have no understanding whatever of the firefighter’s intended meaning … or that, in order for everyone to reach a place of safety, it is necessary for firefighters to ensure that safe, accessible routes from the building (i.e. clear of all obstacles, e.g. fire hose lines) are prepared for, thoroughly, in advance of any fire incident … and actually provided should one occur.

Panic attacks during an emergency do exist !   Standard movement times for people evacuating do not exist !!   And … firefighters may themselves become impaired during a building fire incident !!!

  4.     As for building designers … where do I even start ??   Much could, and should, be done in the design and initial construction of a building to assure firefighter safety.  But … where does any requirement to consider this issue appear in national building codes/regulations ??

I have already discussed this matter in relation to European Union (EU) Regulation 305/2011 on Construction Products, where such a requirement is contained in Basic Requirement for Construction Works 2: ‘Safety in Case of Fire’ (Annex I).

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2005 NIST WTC RECOMMENDATIONS

GROUP 6.  Improved Emergency Response

Technologies and procedures for emergency response should be improved to enable better access to buildings, response operations, emergency communications, and command and control in large-scale emergencies.

NIST WTC Recommendation 21.

NIST recommends the installation of fire-protected and structurally hardened elevators to improve emergency response activities in tall buildings by providing timely emergency access to responders and allowing evacuation of mobility-impaired building occupants.  Such elevators should be installed for exclusive use by emergency responders during emergencies.*  In tall buildings, consideration also should be given to installing such elevators for use by all occupants.  NIST has found that the physiological impacts on emergency responders of climbing numerous (e.g. 20 or more) storeys makes it difficult to conduct effective and timely firefighting and rescue operations in building emergencies without functioning elevators.  The use of elevators for these purposes will require additional operating procedures and protocols, as well as a requirement for release of elevator door restrictors by emergency response personnel.

[ * F-44  The access time for emergency responders, in tall building emergencies where elevators are not functioning and only stairways can be used, averages between 1 minute and 2 minutes per floor, which, for example, corresponds to between 1½ and 2 hours (depending on the amount of gear and equipment carried) to reach the 60th floor of a tall building.  Further, the physiological impact on the emergency responders of climbing more than 10 to 12 floors in a tall building makes it difficult for them to immediately begin aggressive firefighting and rescue operations.]

Affected Standards:  ASME A 17, ANSI 117.1, NFPA 70, NFPA 101, NFPA 1221, NFPA 1500, NFPA 1561, NFPA 1620, and NFPA 1710.  Model Building and Fire Codes:  The standards should be adopted in model building and fire codes by mandatory reference to, or incorporation of, the latest edition of the standard.

NIST WTC Recommendation 22.

NIST recommends the installation, inspection, and testing of emergency communications systems, radio communications, and associated operating protocols to ensure that the systems and protocols:  (1) are effective for large-scale emergencies in buildings with challenging radio frequency propagation environments;  and (2) can be used to identify, locate, and track emergency responders within indoor building environments and in the field.  The federal government should co-ordinate its efforts that address this need within the framework provided by the SAFECOM programme of the Department of Homeland Security.

a.     Rigorous procedures, including pre-emergency inspection and testing, should be developed and implemented for ensuring the operation of emergency communications systems and radio communications in tall buildings and other large structures (including tunnels and subways), or at locations where communications are difficult.

b.     Performance requirements should be developed for emergency communications systems and radio communications that are used within buildings or in built-up urban environments, including standards for design, testing, certification, maintenance, and inspection of such systems.

c.     An interoperable architecture for emergency communication networks – and associated operating protocols – should be developed for unit operations within and across agencies in large-scale emergencies.  The overall network architecture should cover local networking at incident sites, dispatching, and area-wide networks, considering: (a) the scale of needed communications in terms of the number of emergency responders using the system in a large-scale emergency and the organizational hierarchy; and (b) challenges associated with radio frequency propagation, especially in buildings; (c) interoperability with existing legacy emergency communications systems (i.e. between conventional two-way systems and newer wireless network systems); and (d) the need to identify, locate, and track emergency responders at an incident site.

Affected Standards:  FCC, SAFECOM, NFPA Standards on Electronic Safety Equipment, NFPA 70, NFPA 297, and NFPA 1221.  Model Building Codes:  The standards should be adopted in model building codes by mandatory reference to, or incorporation of, the latest edition of the standard.

NIST WTC Recommendation 23.

NIST recommends the establishment and implementation of detailed procedures and methods for gathering, processing, and delivering critical information through integration of relevant voice, video, graphical, and written data to enhance the situational awareness of all emergency responders.  An information intelligence sector* should be established to co-ordinate the effort for each incident.

[ * F-45  A group of individuals that is knowledgeable, experienced, and specifically trained in gathering, processing, and delivering information critical for emergency response operations, and is ready for activation in large and/or dangerous events.]

Affected Standards:  National Incident Management System (NIMS), NRP, SAFECOM, FCC, NFPA Standards on Electronic Safety Equipment, NFPA 1221, NFPA 1500, NFPA 1561, NFPA 1620, and NFPA 1710.  Model Building Codes:  The standards should be adopted in model building codes by mandatory reference to, or incorporation of, the latest edition of the standard.

NIST WTC Recommendation 24.

NIST recommends the establishment and implementation of codes and protocols for ensuring effective and uninterrupted operation of the command and control system for large-scale building emergencies.

a.     State, local, and federal jurisdictions should implement the National Incident Management System (NIMS).  The jurisdictions should work with the Department of Homeland Security to review, test, evaluate, and implement an effective unified command and control system.  NIMS addresses interagency co-ordination and establishes a response matrix – assigning lead agency responsibilities for different types of emergencies, and functions.  At a minimum, each supporting agency should assign an individual to provide co-ordination with the lead agency at each incident command post.

b.     State, local, and federal emergency operations centres (EOC’s) should be located, designed, built, and operated with security and operational integrity as a key consideration.

c.     Command posts should be established outside the potential collapse footprint of any building which shows evidence of large multi-floor fires or has serious structural damage.  A continuous assessment of building stability and safety should be made in such emergencies to guide ongoing operations and enhance emergency responder safety.  The information necessary to make these assessments should be made available to those assigned responsibility (see related Recommendations 15 and 23).

d.     An effective command system should be established and operating before a large number of emergency responders and apparatus are dispatched and deployed.  Through training and drills, emergency responders and ambulances should be required to await dispatch requests from the incident command system and not to self-dispatch in large-scale emergencies.

e.     Actions should be taken via training and drills to ensure a co-ordinated and effective emergency response at all levels of the incident command chain by requiring all emergency responders that are given an assignment to immediately adopt and execute the assignment objectives.

f.     Command post information and incident operations data should be managed and broadcast to command and control centres at remote locations so that information is secure and accessible by all personnel needing the information.  Methods should be developed and implemented so that any information that is available at an interior information centre is transmitted to an emergency responder vehicle or command post outside the building.

Affected Standards:  National Incident Management System (NIMS), NRP, SAFECOM, FCC, NFPA Standards on Electronic Safety Equipment, NFPA 1221, NFPA 1500, NFPA 1561, NFPA 1620, and NFPA 1710.  Model Building Codes:  The standards should be adopted in model building codes by mandatory reference to, or incorporation of, the latest edition of the standard.

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NIST WTC Recommendations 12-15 > Improved Active Protection

Previous Posts in This Series …

2011-10-25:  NIST’s Recommendations on the 9-11 WTC Building CollapsesGROUP 1. Increased Structural Integrity – Recommendations 1, 2 & 3 (out of 30)

2011-11-18:  NIST WTC Recommendations 4-7 > Structural Fire EnduranceGROUP 2.  Enhanced Fire Endurance of Structures – Recommendations 4, 5, 6 & 7

2011-11-24:  NIST WTC Recommendations 8-11 > New Design of StructuresGROUP 3.  New Methods for Fire Resisting Design of Structures – Recommendations 8, 9, 10 & 11

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2011-11-25:  SOME PRELIMINARY COMMENTS …

  1.     Reliability has always been an issue with Active Fire Protection Systems … but, it is neither acknowledged, nor fully understood, that … Reliability Is Equally An Issue With Passive Fire Protection Measures !

Furthermore, the following should always be taken into account when considering the Safety Factors to be applied in calculating the level of satisfactory fire safety and protection which is provided in a specific project … one of the design objectives in Ethical Fire Engineering.

For example, if Category C below is indicative of the design and construction quality on a particular building site … just think of the Priory Hall Apartment Development in Dublin (!) … the Safety Factors to be applied in the design should be high … and with regard to actual construction, it should be expected that the Reliability of both Active Fire Protection Systems and Passive Fire Protection Measures will be initially low … with Life Cycle Reliability being entirely non-existent.

Quality of Fire Engineering Design & Related Construction 

Category A

(a)   Design of the works is exercised by an independent, appropriately qualified and experienced architect/engineer/fire engineer, with design competence relating to fire safety and protection in buildings … and, most importantly, that he/she interacts directly with the Project Design Professional in Responsible Charge ;

(b)   Installation/fitting of related construction products/systems is exercised by appropriately qualified and experienced personnel, with construction competence relating to fire safety and protection in buildings ;

(c)   Supervision of the works is exercised by appropriately qualified and experienced personnel from the principal construction organization ;

(d)   Regular inspections, by appropriately qualified and experienced personnel familiar with the design, and independent of the construction organization(s), are carried out to verify that the works are being executed in accordance with the fire engineering design.

Category B

(a)   Design of the works is exercised by an independent, appropriately qualified and experienced architect/engineer/fire engineer ;

(b)   Installation/fitting of fire-related construction products/systems is exercised by appropriately qualified and experienced personnel ;

(c)   Supervision of the works is exercised by appropriately qualified and experienced personnel from the principal construction organization.

Category C

This level of design and construction execution is assumed when the requirements for Category A or Category B are not met.

  2.     With regard to Recommendations 12 & 13 below … in an earlier post in this series, and elsewhere, I have defined Disproportionate Damage … and differentiated that structural concept from the related concept of Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse.

A significant number of countries include a requirement on Resistance to Disproportionate Damage in their national building codes.  Often, it is only necessary to consider this requirement in the case of buildings having 5 Storeys, or more … a completely arbitrary height threshold.  I would consider that adequately tying together the horizontal and vertical structural elements of a building … any building … is a fundamental principle of good structural engineering !!

Putting it simply … for the purpose of showing compliance with this structural requirement … it is necessary to demonstrate that a building will remain structurally stable if a portion of the building’s structure is removed … always remembering that every building comprises both structure and fabric, i.e. non-structure.

In reality this may happen, and quite often does happen, when, for example, a large truck runs into the side of a building, which can happen anywhere … or there is a gas explosion in some part of the building, which happened in Dublin’s Raglan House back in 1987, and many times in other countries … or a plane hits a high-rise building, which happened to Milan’s iconic Pirelli Tower in 2002, and to New York’s Empire State Building way back in 1945 … etc., etc.  Raglan House collapsed … the Pirelli Tower and the Empire State Building did not.

[ The World Trade Center Towers were originally designed to absorb the impact of a large plane and to remain structurally stable afterwards … in ambient conditions.  However, what was not considered in the ambient structural design was ‘fire’, i.e. the fuel tanks were empty and no fire in the building would be initiated as a result of the mechanical damage caused by the plane impact … which, on 11 September 2001, proved to be a ridiculous basis for any structural design !   This is why 9-11 should be regarded, at its core, as being a very serious ‘real’ fire incident.]

What I am leading up to is this … the concept of removing a portion of a building, and it remaining structurally stable afterwards … should now – logically and rationally – also be incorporated into the fire engineering design of Active Fire Protection Systems.  In other words, if a portion of a building is removed, will any particular Active Fire Protection System continue to operate effectively in the rest of the building ?   This has implications for the location and adequate protection of critical system components in a building … and for the necessary redundancy, zoning and back-up alternative routeing which must be designed into the system from the beginning !

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2005 NIST WTC RECOMMENDATIONS

GROUP 4.  Improved Active Fire Protection

Active fire protection systems (i.e. sprinklers, standpipes/hoses, fire alarms, and smoke management systems) should be enhanced through improvements to the design, performance, reliability, and redundancy of such systems.

NIST WTC Recommendation 12.

NIST recommends that the performance and possibly the redundancy of active fire protection systems (sprinklers, standpipes/hoses, fire alarms, and smoke management systems) in buildings be enhanced to accommodate the greater risks associated with increasing building height and population, increased use of open spaces, high-risk building activities, fire department response limits, transient fuel loads, and higher threat profile.  The performance attributes should deal realistically with the system design basis, reliability of automatic/manual operations, redundancy, and reduction of vulnerabilities due to single point failures.  Affected Standards:  NFPA 13, NFPA 14, NFPA 20, NFPA 72, NFPA 90A, NFPA 92A, NFPA 92B, and NFPA 101.  Model Building Codes:  The performance standards should be adopted in model building codes by mandatory reference to, or incorporation of, the latest edition of the standard.

NIST WTC Recommendation 13.

NIST recommends that fire alarm and communications systems in buildings be developed to provide continuous, reliable, and accurate information on the status of life safety conditions at a level of detail sufficient to manage the evacuation process in building fire emergencies;  all communication and control paths in buildings need to be designed and installed to have the same resistance to failure and increased survivability above that specified in present standards.  This should include means to maintain communications with evacuating occupants that can both reassure them and redirect them if conditions change.  Pre-installed fire warden telephone systems can serve a useful purpose and may be installed in buildings and, if so, they should be made available for use by emergency responders.  All communication and control paths in buildings need to be designed and installed to have the same resistance to failure and increased survivability above that specified in present standards.  Affected Standards:  NFPA 1, NFPA 72, and NFPA 101.  Model Building and Fire Codes:  The performance standards should be adopted in model building and fire codes by mandatory reference to, or incorporation of, the latest edition of the standard.

NIST WTC Recommendation 14.

NIST recommends that control panels at fire/emergency command stations in buildings be adapted to accept and interpret a larger quantity of more reliable information from the active fire protection systems that provide tactical decision aids to fire ground commanders, including water flow rates from pressure and flow measurement devices, and that standards for their performance be developed.  Affected Standards:  NFPA 1, NFPA 72, and NFPA 101.  Model Building and Fire Codes:  The performance standards should be adopted in model building and fire codes by mandatory reference to, or incorporation of, the latest edition of the standard.

NIST WTC Recommendation 15.

NIST recommends that systems be developed and implemented for:  (1) real time off-site secure transmission of valuable information from fire alarm and other monitored building systems for use by emergency responders, at any location, to enhance situational awareness and response decisions, and maintain safe and efficient operation;*  and (2) preservation of that information either off-site, or in a black box that will survive a fire or other building failure, for purposes of subsequent investigations and analysis.  Standards for the performance of such systems should be developed, and their use should be required.  Affected Standards:  NFPA 1, NFPA 72, and NFPA 101.  Model Building and Fire Codes:  The performance standards should be adopted in model building and fire codes by mandatory reference to, or incorporation of, the latest edition of the standard.

[ * F-35  The alarm systems in the WTC towers were only capable of determining and displaying: (a) areas that had at some time reached alarm point conditions; and (b) areas that had not.  The quality and reliability of information available to emergency responders at the Fire Command Station was not sufficient to understand the fire conditions.  The only information transmitted outside the buildings was the fact that the buildings had gone into alarm.  Further, the fire alarm system in WTC Building 7, which was transmitted to a monitoring service, was on ‘test mode’ during the morning of 11 September 2001, because routine maintenance was being performed.  Under test mode conditions: (1) the system is typically disabled for the entire building, not just for the area where work is being performed; and (2) alarm signals typically do not show up on an operator console.]

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