World Trade Center

Progressive Collapse of WTC 7 – 2008 NIST Recommendations – Part 1 of 2

Posted 2012-01-18 by CJ Walsh

See the 1st Series of Posts on the 2005 NIST WTC 1 & 2 Collapse Recommendations … which began, here, towards the end of 2011 …

2011-10-25: NIST’s Recommendations on the 9-11 WTC Building Collapses … GROUP 1. Increased Structural Integrity – Recommendations 1, 2 & 3 (out of 30)

Colour plan showing the World Trade Center Complex in New York City, and its surrounding neighbourhood in Manhattan. By means of yellow shading and annotation in red text, the extent of direct damage caused by the collapse of the 2 WTC Towers on 11 September 2001 is shown. Not shown is the much greater extent of indirect damage caused, e.g. dust and debris from the collapses clogged up and destroyed air conditioning systems and ductwork in buildings. Everywhere south of Canal Street was a disaster zone. Also not shown is the damage caused by WTC 7, at the north-eastern tip of the Complex, which collapsed late on the afternoon of 9-11. Click to enlarge.

2012-01-18: SOME PRELIMINARY COMMENTS …

1. World Trade Center Building 7 was a 47 Storey Office Building located at the north -eastern tip of the WTC Complex in Lower Manhattan, New York City. It had been built on top of an existing Consolidated Edison of New York electric power substation, on land owned by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.

On Tuesday, 11 September 2001 … WTC Building 7 was on fire for almost seven hours … from the time of the collapse of WTC Tower 1 – North Tower, just before 10.30 hrs (local time), until 17.21 hrs … when WTC 7 failed completely, collapsing progressively as a result of ‘real’ fires – as distinct from ‘standard test’ fires – on many floors.

There were only two certainties on that fateful day (9-11) … the Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse of WTC Building 7 could no longer be ignored by the International Fire Science and Engineering Community … and the ‘reality’, which Modern Fire Engineering must now confront, was significantly altered. Secondly, it is NEVER acceptable to a general population for buildings to collapse !

Later in 2008, the Mumbai ‘Hive’ Attacks would add a sinister new ingredient to the standard threat profile for buildings, their occupants, and emergency services.

However, long before 9-11 and Mumbai, the growing complexity of modern communities and their rapidly evolving architectural forms had left the Fire Engineer far behind, unable to respond to the new fire safety challenges posed.

2. The second of the NIST Publications being referenced in this New Series of Posts is as follows …

NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology). August 2008. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Final Report on the Collapse of World Trade Center Building 7. NIST NCSTAR 1A. Gaithersburg, MD, USA.

This 2008 NIST Report contains, in Chapter 5, a list of 13 Recommendations for Action (A-M), grouped together under the same 8 Subject Headings used in the 2005 NIST Report (NCSTAR 1) …

i) Increased structural integrity … Recommendation A ;

ii) Enhanced fire endurance of structures … Recommendations B, C, D & E ;

iii) New methods for fire resisting design of structures … Recommendations F & G ;

iv) Improved active fire protection … Recommendation H ;

v) Improved building evacuation … Long before its collapse, all occupants/users had evacuated WTC 7 … No Recommendation ;

vi) Improved emergency response … Recommendation I ;

vii) Improved procedures and practices … Recommendations J & K ; and

viii) Education and training … Recommendations L & M.

NIST has clearly stated that “the urgency of these Recommendations is substantially reinforced by their pertinence to the collapse of a tall building that was based on a structural system design that is in widespread use”.

3. The Colour Coding of Texts which I am using in this new series of posts … where NIST has presented new texts relating to WTC Building 7, these are shown in blue … where NIST has chosen to reinforce earlier texts from the 2005 Report on the WTC Towers 1 & 2 Collapses, these are shown in black. The important new paragraphs describing the critical relevance of WTC Building 7 are shown in red.

Please pay particular attention to these Red Paragraphs. Having carefully digested their contents … then if, by any chance, you happen to encounter somebody who still insists that the NIST 9-11 WTC Recommendations have no relevance to the design, construction, management and operation of ALL Buildings … that person is either living in Alice’s Wonderland … or he/she has never bothered to read the NIST Recommendations in the first place !!

4. While it is still essential to distinguish clearly between the two closely related structural concepts below … I would like to take this opportunity to bring to your attention a necessary and important modification … more, a refinement … to the definition of Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse …

Disproportionate Damage

The failure of a building’s structural system (i) remote from the scene of an isolated overloading action; and (ii) to an extent which is not in reasonable proportion to that action.

Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse

The sequential growth and intensification of structural distortion and displacement, beyond fire engineering design parameters, and the eventual failure of elements of construction in a building – during a fire and the ‘cooling phase’ afterwards – which, if unchecked, will result in disproportionate damage, and may lead to total building collapse.

This modification/refinement recognizes the following … that Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse may commence long before any breach occurs in a Fire Compartment Boundary … that, as a result of rampant commercial pressures in our societies, the tendency is for Compartment Volumes to become far too large to be any longer effective … and in the case of a Sustainable Building, for example, where natural patterns of air movement in buildings are used for either heating or cooling purposes, there may be no Compartments at all !

Restricting the application of one or both of these structural concepts, in law, to Multi-Storey Buildings, i.e. in many jurisdictions, those buildings having 5 or more storeys … is a purely arbitrary cut-off point.

CIB W14’s Research Working Group IV: ‘Structural Reliability & Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse’ would argue, rationally, that both of these concepts are fundamental to all structural fire engineering design.

5. Structural Fire Engineering is concerned with those aspects of fire engineering which relate to structural design for fire, and the complex architectural interaction between a building’s structure and fabric, i.e. non-structure, under conditions of fire and its immediate aftermath.

As Chair of CIB W14’s Research Working Group IV … I will shortly be making a Workshop Presentation in Europe, the aim of which will be to set the scene for the launch of an International CIB W14 Research WG IV Reflection Document; the specific objective of the Presentation, however, will be to accurately describe the phenomenon that is Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse … and to outline a necessary new design approach which will fulfil future requirements, legal and otherwise, concerning adequate resistance to this phenomenon.

It will be shown that the new design approach is fully compatible with the Recommendations contained in the 2005 and 2008 NIST Reports on the 9-11 World Trade Center Buildings 1, 2 & 7 Collapses – NCSTAR 1 & NCSTAR 1A.

2008 NIST WTC 7 RECOMMENDATIONS (Final Report NCSTAR 1A)

5.1 GENERAL

In its final report on the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers (NIST NCSTAR 1), NIST made 30 Recommendations for improving the safety of buildings, occupants, and emergency responders. These encompass increased structural integrity, enhanced fire endurance of structures, new methods for fire resisting design of structures, improved active fire protection, improved building evacuation, improved emergency response, improved procedures and practices, and education and training.

WTC 7 was unlike the WTC Towers in many respects. It was a more typical tall building in the design of its structural system. It was not struck by an airplane. The fires in WTC 7 were quite different from those in the Towers. Since WTC 7 was not doused with thousands of litres of jet fuel, large areas of any floor were not ignited simultaneously. Instead, the fires in WTC 7 were similar to those that have occurred previously in several tall buildings where the sprinklers did not function or were not present. These other buildings did not succumb to their fires and collapse, because they were of structural designs that differed from that of WTC 7.

The Investigation Team has compiled a list of key factors that enabled ordinary fires to result in an extraordinary outcome. In so doing, the Team recognized that there were additional aspects to be included in the content of some of the earlier 30 Recommendations.

Based on the findings of this Investigation, NIST has identified 1 New Recommendation and has reiterated 12 Recommendations from the Investigation of the WTC Towers.

The urgency of the Prior Recommendations is substantially reinforced by their pertinence to the collapse of a tall building that is based on a structural system design that is in widespread use. A few of the Prior Recommendations have been modified to reflect the findings of this Investigation.

The partial or total collapse of a building due to fires is an infrequent event. This is particularly true for buildings with a reliably operating active fire protection system, such as an automatic fire sprinkler system. A properly designed and operating automatic sprinkler system will contain fires while they are small and, in most instances, prevent them from growing and spreading to threaten structural integrity.

The intent of current practice, based on prescriptive standards and codes, is to achieve life safety, not collapse prevention. However, the key premise of NIST’s Recommendations is that buildings should not collapse in infrequent (worst-case) fires that may occur when active fire protection systems are rendered ineffective, e.g. when sprinklers do not exist, are not functional, or are overwhelmed by the fire.

Fire scenarios for structural design based on single compartment or single floor fires are not appropriate representations of infrequent fire events. Such events have occurred in several tall buildings resulting in unexpected substantial losses. Instead, historical data suggests that infrequent fires which should be considered in structural design have characteristics that include: ordinary combustibles and combustible load levels, local fire origin on any given floor, no widespread use of accelerants, consecutive fire spread from combustible to combustible, fire-induced window breakage providing ventilation for continued fire spread and accelerated fire growth, concurrent fires on multiple floors, and active fire protection systems rendered ineffective. The fires in WTC 7 had all of these characteristics.

NIST believes the Recommendations are realistic, appropriate, and achievable within a reasonable period of time. NIST strongly urges that immediate and serious consideration be given to these Recommendations by the building and fire safety communities in order to achieve appropriate improvements in the way buildings are designed, constructed, maintained, and used – with the goal of making buildings safer in future emergencies.

A complete listing of all 13 Recommendations (Recommendations A through L) based on this Investigation follows. Under a few of the Recommendations, the pertinent lesson from the reconstruction of the WTC 7 Collapse is reflected in the form of a modification. For the 12 Reiterated Recommendations, the pertinent codes, standards, and organizations were listed in Table 9-1, and Tables 9-2a through 9-2c of NIST NCSTAR 1 and are not repeated here. For the 1 New Recommendation, B, this information is provided in the text.

5.1.1 GROUP 1. Increased Structural Integrity

The standards for estimating the load effects of potential hazards (e.g. progressive collapse, wind) and the design of structural systems to mitigate the effects of those hazards should be improved to enhance structural integrity.

NIST WTC 7 Recommendation A (NCSTAR 1 Recommendation 1).

NIST recommends that: (1) progressive collapse be prevented in buildings through the development and nationwide adoption of consensus standards and code provisions, along with the tools and guidelines needed for their use in practice; and (2) a standard methodology be developed – supported by analytical design tools and practical design guidance – to reliably predict the potential for complex failures in structural systems subjected to multiple hazards.

Relevance to WTC 7: Had WTC 7 been expressly designed for prevention of fire-induced progressive collapse, it would have been sufficiently robust to withstand local failure due to the fires without suffering total collapse.

5.1.2 GROUP 2. Enhanced Fire Endurance of Structures

The procedures and practices used to ensure the fire endurance of structures should be enhanced by improving the technical basis for construction classifications and fire resistance ratings, improving the technical basis for standard fire resistance testing methods, use of the ‘structural frame’ approach to fire resistance ratings, and developing in-service performance requirements and conformance criteria for sprayed fire resisting materials.

NIST WTC 7 Recommendation B (New)

NIST recommends that buildings be explicitly evaluated to ensure the adequate performance of the structural system under worst-case design fires with any active fire protection system rendered ineffective. Of particular concern are the effects of thermal expansion in buildings with one or more of the following features: (1) long-span floor systems* which experience significant thermal expansion and sagging effects; (2) connection designs (especially shear connections) that cannot accommodate thermal effects; (3) floor framing that induces asymmetric thermally-induced (i.e. net lateral) forces on girders; (4) shear studs that could fail due to differential thermal expansion in composite floor systems; and (5) lack of shear studs on girders. Careful consideration should also be given to the possibility of other design features that may adversely affect the performance of the structural system under fire conditions.

[ * F-6 Typical floor span lengths in tall office buildings are in the range of 12-15 metres; this range is considered to represent long-span systems. Thermal effects (e.g. thermal expansion) that may be significant in long-span buildings may also be present in buildings with shorter span lengths, depending on the design of the structural system.]

Building owners, operators, and designers are strongly urged to act upon this Recommendation. Engineers should be able to design cost-effective fixes to address any areas of concern that are identified by these evaluations. Several existing, emerging, or even anticipated capabilities could have helped prevent the collapse of WTC 7. The degree to which these capabilities improve performance remains to be evaluated. Possible options for developing cost-effective fixes include:

More robust connections and framing systems to better resist the effects of thermal expansion on the structural system ;
Structural systems expressly designed to prevent progressive collapse. The current model building codes do not require that buildings be designed to resist progressive collapse ;
Better thermal insulation (i.e. reduced conductivity and/or increased thickness) to limit heating of structural steel and to minimize both thermal expansion and weakening effects. Currently, insulation is used to protect steel strength, but it could also be used to maintain a lower temperature in the steel framing to limit thermal expansion ;
Improved compartmentation in tenant areas to limit spread of fires ;
Thermally resisting window assemblies which limit breakage, reduce air supply, and retard fire growth.

Industry should partner with the research community to fill critical gaps in knowledge about how structures perform in real fires, particularly considering: the effects of fire on the entire structural system; the interactions between sub-systems, elements, and connections; and scaling of fire test results to full-scale structures, especially for structures with long-span floor systems.

Affected Standards: ASCE 7, ASCE/SFPE 29, AISC Specifications, and ACI 318. Development of performance objectives, design criteria, evaluation methods, design guidance, and computational tools should begin promptly, leading to new standards.

Model Building Codes: The new standard should be adopted in model building codes (IBC, NFPA 5000) by mandatory reference to, or incorporation of, the latest edition of the standard.

Relevance to WTC 7: The effects of restraint of free thermal expansion on the steel framing systems, especially for the long spans on the east side of WTC 7, were not considered in the structural design and led to the initiation of the building collapse.

NIST WTC 7 Recommendation C (NCSTAR 1 Recommendation 4).

NIST recommends evaluating, and where needed improving, the technical basis for determining appropriate construction classifications and fire rating requirements (especially for tall buildings) – and making related code changes now, as much as possible – by explicitly considering factors including:*

[ * F-7 The construction classification and fire rating requirements should be risk-consistent with respect to the design-basis hazards and the consequences of those hazards. The fire rating requirements, which were originally developed based on experience with buildings less than 20 storeys in height, have generally decreased over the past 80 years since historical fire data for buildings suggest considerable conservatism in those requirements. For tall buildings, the likely consequences of a given threat to an occupant on the upper floors are more severe than the consequences to an occupant on the first floor or the lower floors. For example, with non-functioning elevators, both of the time requirements are much greater for full building evacuation from upper floors and emergency responder access to those floors. The current height and areas tables in building codes do not provide the technical basis for the progressively increasing risk to an occupant on the upper floors of tall buildings that are much greater than 20 storeys in height.]

timely access by emergency responders and full evacuation of occupants, or the time required for burnout without partial collapse ;
the extent to which redundancy in active fire protection systems (sprinklers and standpipe, fire alarm, and smoke management) should be credited for occupant life safety ;*

[ * F-8 Occupant life safety, prevention of fire spread, and structural integrity are considered separate safety objectives.]

the need for redundancy in fire protection systems that are critical to structural integrity ;*

[ * F-9 The passive fire protection system (including the application of fire protection insulation, compartmentation, and fire stopping) and the active sprinkler system each provide redundancy for maintaining structural integrity in a building fire, should one of the systems fail to perform its intended function.]

the ability of the structure and local floor systems to withstand a maximum credible fire scenario* without collapse, recognizing that sprinklers could be compromised, not operational, or non-existent ;

[ * F-10 A maximum credible fire scenario includes conditions that are severe, but reasonable to anticipate, conditions related to building construction, occupancy, fire loads, ignition sources, compartment geometry, fire control methods, etc., as well as adverse, but reasonable to anticipate operating conditions.]

compartmentation requirements (e.g. 1,200 sq.m*) to protect the structure, including fire rated doorsets and automatic enclosures, and limiting air supply (e.g. thermally resisting window assemblies) to retard fire spread in buildings with large, open floor plans ;

[ * F-11 Or a more appropriate limit, which represents a reasonable area for active fire fighting operations.]

the effect of spaces containing unusually large fuel concentrations for the expected occupancy of the building ; and
the extent to which fire control systems, including suppression by automatic or manual means, should be credited as part of the prevention of fire spread.

Relevance to WTC 7: The floor systems in WTC 7 failed at lower temperatures because thermal effects within the structural system, especially thermal expansion, were not considered in setting the fire rating requirements in the construction classification, which are determined using the ASTM E 119 or equivalent testing standard.

NIST WTC 7 Recommendation D (NCSTAR 1 Recommendation 5).

NIST recommends that the technical basis for the century-old standard for fire resistance testing of components, assemblies and systems be improved through a national effort. Necessary guidance also should be developed for extrapolating the results of tested assemblies to prototypical building systems. A key step in fulfilling this Recommendation is to establish a capability for studying and testing components, assemblies, and systems under realistic fire and load conditions.

Of particular concern is that the Standard Fire Resistance Test does not adequately capture important thermally-induced interactions between structural sub-systems, elements, and connections that are critical to structural integrity. System-level interactions, especially due to thermal expansion, are not considered in the standard test method since columns, girders, and floor sub-assemblies are tested separately. Also, the performance of connections under both gravity and thermal effects is not considered. The United States currently does not have the capability for studying and testing these important fire-induced phenomena critical to structural safety.

Relevance to WTC 7: The floor systems failed in WTC 7 at shorter fire exposure times than the specified fire rating (two hours) and at lower temperatures because thermal effects within the structural system, especially thermal expansion, were not considered in setting the endpoint criteria when using the ASTM E 110 or equivalent testing standard. The structural breakdowns that led to the initiating event, and the eventual collapse of WTC 7, occurred at temperatures that were hundreds of degrees below the criteria that determine structural fire resistance ratings.

NIST WTC 7 Recommendation E (NCSTAR 1 Recommendation 7).

NIST recommends the adoption and use of the ‘structural frame’ approach to fire resistance ratings. This approach requires all members that comprise the primary structural frame (such as columns, girders, beams, trusses, and spandrels) be fire protected to the higher fire resistance rating required for the columns. The definition of the primary structural frame should be expanded to include bracing members that are essential to the vertical stability of the primary structural frame under gravity loading (e.g. girders, diagonal bracing, composite floor systems that provide lateral bracing to the girders) whether or not the bracing members carry gravity loads. Some of these bracing members may not have direct connections to the columns, but provide stability to those members directly connected to the columns. This Recommendation modifies the definition of the primary structural frame adopted in the 2007 supplement to the International Building Code (IBC). The IBC considers members of floor or roof construction that are not connected to the columns not to be part of the primary structural frame. This Recommendation ensures consistency in the fire protection provided to all of the structural elements that contribute to overall structural stability. State and local jurisdictions should adopt and enforce this requirement.

Relevance to WTC 7: Thermally-induced breakdown of the floor system in WTC 7 was a determining step in causing failure initiation and progressive collapse. Therefore, the floor system should be considered as an integral part of the primary structural frame.

END

Emergency Services in Europe – Occupational Health & Safety

Posted 2012-01-14 by CJ Walsh

2012-01-14: I do hope that everyone had a wonderful Christmas and New Year’s Eve ! I spent the time on an interesting project in Cuba … but more about that later.

Before launching into a new, much shorter series of posts on the 2008 NIST WTC Recommendations … I wanted to bring to your attention a related, and recently issued, EU-OSHA Publication: ‘Emergency Services: A Literature Review on Occupational Safety & Health Risks’.

I have touched upon this important issue before. AND … unfortunately, the lack of any proper consideration of this issue by Spatial Planners and Building Designers continues to receive insufficient attention at European and International Levels !

In its own explanatory blurb …

‘ The European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA) contributes to making Europe a safer, healthier and more productive place to work. The Agency researches, develops, and distributes reliable, balanced, and impartial safety and health information and organizes pan-European awareness raising campaigns.

Set up by the European Union in 1996 and based in Bilbao, Spain, the Agency brings together representatives from the European Commission, Member State governments, employers’ and workers’ organizations, as well as leading experts in each of the EU-27 Member States and beyond.’

The EU-OSHA WebSite is located at … http://osha.europa.eu

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY – EU-OSHA ‘Emergency Services’ Publication (October 2011)

Emergency Workers comprise large professional groups ranging from career and volunteer firefighters, police officers, emergency medical staff (paramedics – emergency medical technicians – doctors – nurses) to psychologists. In major disasters, rescue workers, technicians from large relief organizations, additional medical staff, military personnel, anti-terrorist forces, body handlers, clean-up workers, construction workers, and numerous volunteers are involved. Depending on the emergency/disaster site, emergency workers need specialization, for instance in water rescue, mountain rescue or rescue from heights. Current environmental, economic, and political developments and trend data all suggest an increase in the severity and frequency of disasters in the future. Phenomena that support this assumption include increased energy use, progressive global warming, climate change and pollution, population growth, dispersal of industrialization around the globe, expansion of transportation facilities, and the growing spread of terrorism. The growing issue of better protection for emergency workers from Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Risks has been emphasized as a priority by many experts. The demands made upon emergency workers, as well as the OSH Risks they are exposed to, will rise as they are confronted with events greater in both number and severity.

Although the exact number of emergency workers is difficult to estimate, the available figures and the large number of people affected by disasters and in need of immediate help are reliable indicators that emergency workers account for a significant proportion of the European Workforce. Exact numbers can be given for some groups, such as firefighters. According to the report by the International Labour Organization (ILO), in European countries there is on average one firefighter for every 1,000–1,200 inhabitants. There are also a considerable number of volunteer firefighters.

Emergency workers’ priorities are to protect human life, property and the environment, and their most common fields of action include:

everyday emergencies (road accidents, crime scenes, gas explosions, fires) ;
natural disasters (floods, storms, fires, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions) ;
industrial accidents (involving hazardous materials, such as in the nuclear and mining sectors) ;
transport accidents (major car crashes, plane crashes, rail accidents) ;
terrorist and criminal attacks (bomb attacks, gas attacks, shootings) ;
massive public events (negative events during concerts, sport events, demonstrations).

The absolute numbers of emergency workers involved in specific events are often not easy to obtain. Some figures can be found in media reports. Around 4,000 emergency workers were involved during mud spills in Hungary (2010); 5,500 police and emergency workers were mobilised to organize evacuation during crowd panic in Duisburg, Germany (2010); 240,000 emergency workers and 2,000 members of the armed forces dealt with forest fires in Russia (2010); more than 500 emergency workers were sent to a mine explosion in Russia (2010); 2,500 rescue workers, including 1,500 firefighters, were sent to the area affected by an earthquake in central Italy (2009); up to 70,000 emergency workers took part in the massive operation after the terrorist attack at the World Trade Center in New York, including policemen, firefighters, and construction workers (2001); 200,000 recovery workers were involved in clean-up activities in 1986–1987 after the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl (1986).

European emergency workers are often involved in dealing with major catastrophes that happen outside Europe. After the earthquake in Haiti (2010), a 64-member search and rescue team was sent from the UK; more than 500 personnel, particularly rescue workers, were sent by France; 450 troops, 50 doctors, technicians and specialists were sent from Spain; more than 20 emergency workers went from Portugal; a plane with a search and rescue team went from the Netherlands; and three medical teams were sent from Hungary.

All types of emergency workers can be involved in any kind of intervention, and the spectrum of possible demands and risks those workers may encounter is very wide. They may be especially high when the management and preparedness are poor, and there is lack of or insufficient co-ordination, information and communication, lack of training, and inappropriate or insufficient safety and personal protective equipment.

There are some General OSH Hazards and Risks likely to occur in any kind of emergency intervention:

Demanding work environment: working in remote, difficult to access areas; unstable and extremely difficult weather conditions; and unpredictable hazards at the disaster scene such as the danger of collapse of damaged structures. High risk of violence.
Emotional and psychological overstrain: dealing with many fatalities and injured people; high responsibility for people’s lives; time pressure; and long, unpredictable working hours.
Physical overstrain: physically demanding work; insufficient breaks; manual handling (wearing heavy protective equipment, transportation of patients, carrying dead bodies, removal of debris).

Additionally, particular types of emergency events are related to the greater possibility of other, more Specific OSH Hazards. Natural disasters may put emergency workers at risk of:

water-borne diseases where there is contact with contaminated water (diarrhoea, cholera, typhoid fever, hepatitis A, hepatitis E, parasitic diseases, rotavirus, and shigellosis) ;
infectious (tuberculosis) and blood-borne diseases (HIV, hepatitis B, and hepatitis C) as a consequence of contact with survivors and dead bodies, and the possibility of infection transmitted by needle-stick injuries ;
vector-borne diseases (malaria, dengue, St. Louis encephalitis, and West Nile fever) transmitted by mosquitoes ;
respiratory and asthmatic problems, including asphyxiation, heat stress, and the carcinogenic effects of volcanic eruptions, landslides and earthquakes, and fires leading to significant release of ash and gases, and dust ;
being trapped or seriously injured by debris, working in confined spaces, drowning, confrontation with wild, aggressive or infected, domestic animals.

Industrial Accidents may lead to:

fatalities, serious injuries, and short and long-term health problems stemming from accidents caused by explosions, followed by fires and the release of toxic substances; the health consequences may include headache, confusion, fainting, agitation, delirium or convulsions, respiratory complaints, cardiovascular complaints, renal failure, eye and skin problems and gastrointestinal problems ;
severe health consequences such as burns, skin diseases, and incurable diseases including different kinds of cancer, Acute Radiation Syndrome (ARS) and death as a result of nuclear radiation.

Transport Accidents may involve:

the risk of being struck by a passing vehicle ;
specific risks associated with accidents involving the transport of dangerous substances, hazardous materials, or stemming from burning fuel or chemicals used in vehicles which have ignited or exploded.

Terrorist and Criminal Attacks may involve:

unfamiliar, unpredictable, confused, and complex scenarios ;
the risk of death or serious injury, injury from weapons and the prospect of being taken as a hostage ;
the risk of being exposed to chemical and radiological hazards ;
a possibility of bio-terrorism using biological agents such as smallpox, anthrax, botulism, tularaemia, and viral haemorrhagic fevers which can be easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person and cause high mortality.

Negative Events during Massive Public Events may lead to:

specific risks, varying from scenario to scenario, including fire, collapsing buildings, violence, terrorist attacks ;
specific hazards stemming from violent behaviour and the unpredictable acts of a panicking crowd, such as people trying to escape from a confined space.

Emergency Workers are exposed to a combination of many different risks and there may be many possible consequences for their safety and health. Possible OSH outcomes have been explored by the analysis of relevant statistics and studies.

Although the risk of Fatalities caused by burn injuries is considered to be relatively small, these kinds of accidents continue to happen. Data from the UK shows that in the period 2003–2008, 22 firefighters died on duty, significantly more than in the previous five years. From February 1996 to October 2002, there were no recorded fire deaths in the UK among firefighters who actually attended fires, whereas in the years 2002–2005 13 firefighters were killed at fires. These statistics do not include fatal heart attacks which happened during the emergency intervention, nor road traffic accidents in transit to or from the accident. Statistics on fatal accidents indicate that in the US, 43% of firefighters’ deaths in 2009 were caused by sudden cardiac death, 34% by internal trauma, 6% by asphyxiation, 6% by stroke, 6% by ‘other’ causes, 4% by burns, and 1% by gunshot. The high prevalence of fatalities due to cardiovascular overexertion among firefighters (triggered, for instance, by the emergency alarm that abruptly terminates sedentary activity and begins intense exertion, the very high heart rates recorded during firefighting, exposure to extreme heat, and wearing of heavy protective equipment) has been confirmed by many studies. Also at high risk are emergency medical staff and ambulance personnel. Fatal accidents can occur as an immediate consequence of vehicle-related accidents, homicides (a higher prevalence of this among emergency medical workers compared to other medical staff has been reported), and terrorist attacks (such as the hundreds of emergency workers who died in the aftermath of the 2001 attack at the World Trade Center). In Sweden in 2002, 80% of emergency paramedics reported being threatened or experiencing physical violence. Fatalities are also related to radiological exposure caused by industrial accidents. Out of 237 emergency workers involved in the 1986 disaster at Chernobyl and later diagnosed with acute radiation syndrome (ARS), 28 died from ARS in the following months, and a further 19 in the years afterwards.

Available statistics indicate the significant prevalence of Non-Fatal Accidents and Injuries among emergency workers. For instance, the number of non-fatal accidents suffered by firefighters in Finland ranged between 500 and 600 per year during the period 2005–2007 out of a total population of about 19,000 firefighters. German data shows that accidents while moving, such as being struck or hit by objects, are the most prevalent, following those involving manual handling and dealing with dangerous, sharp, pointed, stiff, or rough-textured objects. In 2004–2005, the most frequent non-fatal accidents among workers in the fire services of the United Kingdom were injuries while handling, lifting or carrying (41.3%), followed by slips, trips or falls on the same level (27.6%) and being hit by a moving, flying or falling object (8.9%). Many other studies confirm that back injuries and upper and lower extremity injuries related to transportation of patients and manual handling are the most common types of injuries experienced by emergency workers, leading to many types of musculoskeletal disorders.

In the last 25 years, the Psychological Trauma suffered by emergency and rescue workers has gained the attention of scientists. Although studies show that the majority of rescue workers may experience stress that does not necessarily lead to diagnosable mental disorders, a variety of symptoms such as strong emotional reactions (shock, anger, guilt, helplessness), cognitive reactions (disorientation, lack of concentration), physical reactions (tension, fatigue, pain, racing heartbeat) and social effects (isolation from family and friends) may for some time after an incident have a negative impact on workers’ wellbeing. More serious problems such as acute stress disorder, depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorders (PTSD) have also been diagnosed. A Swedish study indicates a prevalence of between 3% and 25% of PTSD among rescue workers there. In the USA, the national prevalence of PTSD for the general population was recorded at 4%, whereas the highest reported prevalence for a particular group was 25% among rescue workers and 21% among firefighters. Higher rates of ‘burnout’ and problems with substance abuse have also been recorded in these groups, compared to the general population.

Occupational Diseases described in the literature are related to the development of different types of cancer as a consequence of radiological exposure, such as the increase in cases of thyroid cancer revealed in a study of Russian emergency workers involved in the Chernobyl disaster. There are also several epidemiological studies which refer to respiratory disorders experienced by emergency workers, including firefighters, rescue workers, clean-up workers, and police officers who were exposed for several months to dust and hazardous toxic pollutants at the WTC disaster scene, showing that WTC-related lower respiratory symptoms were experienced by 60% and upper respiratory symptoms by 74% of the studied sample. Respiratory symptoms include the ‘World Trade Center cough’, a persistent cough that some workers developed after exposure to conditions at the site, and which was accompanied by respiratory symptoms severe enough to require medical leave for at least four weeks. Other serious health problems caused by exposure to hazardous materials and dangerous combustion products include various types of cancer, asbestosis, skin disorders, changes in biochemical and blood parameters, reproductive problems, and even general shorter life expectancy. Many studies, however, show ambiguous results, and further research in this area is needed.

The nature of emergency work makes it impossible to eliminate, or often even significantly reduce, the amount of risk to which personnel are exposed. However, there are many primary and secondary preventive measures which may provide better protection. Some examples of preventive measures at international and national levels include the development of common co-operation and communication procedures, and the introduction of specific laws or policies to protect emergency workers.

Preventive measures at the company level include:

better management (communication and co-ordination) ;
comprehensive risks assessment ;
appropriate preparedness and training (for instance, workers should obtain knowledge about what hazards can be encountered at the disaster scene, the possible physical and mental reactions to them, and how to protect themselves against negative outcomes) ;
vaccination ;
providing appropriate personal protective equipment, protective clothes, safety equipment (for instance, gas detectors, radiation alarm systems, mosquito nets), and ergonomic equipment (firefighter robots, syringe needles that incorporate safety features) ;
providing primary and secondary prevention of mental health problems (psychological preparedness, post-intervention psychological support and help, and long-term psychological care when needed) ;
long-term care and health surveillance alongside mandatory medical examinations, including workplace health promotion projects that provide workers with appropriate and safe keep-fit facilities.

Although major disasters and accidents are always to be expected, past disasters and more recent events demonstrate that communities are still often not fully prepared for dealing with major disasters. It is also clear that the protection of emergency workers against OSH Risks exhibits shortcomings. This literature review indicates some areas in which additional research and actions are necessary. General preventive measures begin with reducing the vulnerability of people to disasters, and reducing the severity of the damage that might be caused by a disaster, resulting in a smaller number of emergency workers needed to take part in disaster control. The OSH of Emergency Workers should be also taken into consideration in the earliest stages of building design, such as by making it possible for lifts to be used during an emergency, and in the formation of emergency response plans at international, national, and organisational level. Rehearsing different terrorist attack scenarios can serve as a way to predict possible hazards for emergency workers. Also essential is the further development of personal protective and other safety equipment, especially against multiple hazards and bio-terrorism, and taking into consideration the possibility of physical overstrain and the difficult working environment of emergency workers. Further longitudinal research on the negative health effects of dangerous substances is needed, including studies on the toxicological properties of the combustion of new products which are constantly being developed and introduced to the market.

END

Concrete Testing Fraud in New York – 1 World Trade Center

Posted 2009-09-9 by CJ Walsh

2009-09-09 …

Background & Verification

Early 2008 … a New York Inquiry into the Concrete Testing Industry begins. At issue is the Structural Reliability of Current Major Public Works Projects in the City, including many Tall Buildings.

Current Internet Search: ‘New York Concrete Testing Inquiry’ … to discover the full measure of fraud and corruption.

I wonder how the U.S. Model Building & Fire Code Organizations … including the U.S. International Code Council … are responding to this growing scandal in New York. Are they responding at all ? AND … do they discuss this sort of issue openly, as they heavily ‘promote’ the adoption of U.S. Codes in Developing Countries around the world ?

What is the position of the Council on Tall Buildings & Urban Habitat (CTBUH) ???

2009-09-08 … by Niki May Young, News Editor, World Architecture News(.com) …

Robert LiMandri, New York’s Buildings Commissioner, has announced that concrete tests are to be carried out on 82 New York buildings following safety concerns arising from the indictment of Testwell Laboratories in January and a further firm in July. Testwell were accused of falsifying concrete mix design reports for the high profile Freedom Tower Project (now 1 World Trade Center), Yankees Stadium, Jet Blue Terminal and a number of other projects and had their license suspended. Stallone Testing Laboratories were also indicted for falsifying concrete mix design reports in July.

The indictment of Testwell led to a lack of confidence in the safety of over 100 buildings in New York. Following investigations, 82 buildings are to be re-examined. The investigations come as part of an announcement by LiMandri of a new comprehensive program to increase the oversight and evaluation of concrete testing at construction projects throughout the City, including projects funded by the City and private developers. The program includes plans to build a city-owned and operated concrete-testing laboratory and the creation of a new Concrete Unit at the Department Of Buildings (DOB).

The new City laboratory, which will be operated by the Department of Design & Construction (DDC) and is expected to open as early as January, will offer testing services to all City agencies responsible for construction projects. New York City has 35 private concrete-testing firms currently licensed to do business in the City and the new facility will also make it possible to audit these firms.

“Concrete testing is a critical component of concrete operations, and the results should affirm the strength and quality of materials used for a building under construction,” said LiMandri. “However, the integrity of concrete-testing practices has come into serious question, and this new laboratory, as well as a new Concrete Unit and re-testing protocol, are three significant measures to ensure concrete testing procedures are lawful and the concrete used meets a project’s specific design requirements.”

DOB denied Testwell’s application to renew its concrete-testing license but a State Supreme Court Judge rejected DOB’s denial of the license renewal. DOB is now appealing that decision. Last Friday, DOB revoked Stallone’s concrete-testing license, prohibiting them from testing concrete in the City. The Department Of Buildings is currently working with property owners named in the Stallone indictment to determine whether a project’s final test results meet the structural design requirements. If they do not, the affected property owners will also be required to follow the re-testing protocol.

“New Yorkers must be confident the City’s buildings have been built to exacting standards and that the concrete, not usually visible, was mixed to proper construction specifications,” added Design and Construction Commissioner Burney.

END

‘Sustainable Fire Engineering’ – Important Indian Presentation !

Posted 2009-09-8 by CJ Walsh

2009-09-08: It is really enjoyable to be back behind my desk, here in Dublin. Apologies for the prolonged absence.

Since the middle of June last, my travels have taken me to Turkey, France, Italy, the south-west of Ireland to attend my cousin’s wedding in Cork … and back again to Bengaluru (Bangalore) in Southern India to make an important Keynote Presentation at the 2009 Fire & Safety Association of India (FSAI) National Fire Seminar: ‘Engineering a Safe & Secure India’, which was held on Friday, 28th August, at the Leela Palace Hotel.

My Presentation Title & Abstract …

Sustainable Fire Engineering: Fire Safety, Protection & Evacuation for All

India, like other economically advanced developing countries, is at an important crossroads. Difficult, resource-dependent decisions must be made in the next few short years concerning the rapid implementation of a Sustainable Built Environment across a vast country, i.e. one which must serve local needs and meet regional performance requirements during a long life cycle … one which will be adaptable to climate change, variability and extremes … will be in harmony and dynamic balance with the Natural Environment … and, not least, will be super energy-efficient.

Citizens of Developed Nations also have legitimate expectations. They will express anger when they witness recently constructed buildings in seismic zones collapse, in an earthquake, like a deck of cards (China 2008, Italy 2009) … or they discover that federal/state authorities having jurisdiction, which are funded by their taxes, are ill-prepared to respond effectively to intentional traumatic disruptions to the Social Environment (New York 2001, Mumbai 2008). Retaining the public’s confidence in national institutions is a fundamental political priority.

In the case of all new High-Rise Buildings, Iconic Buildings, and Buildings of Innovative Design or having a Critical Function … Trans-Disciplinary Building Design Teams must, at a minimum, properly respond to the Recommendations of the 2005 & 2008 NIST(USA) Final Reports on the 9-11 WTC 1, 2, and 7 Collapses. In practice, the majority of these Recommendations should be applied to the design of all new buildings !

Fire Engineers, competent concerning the processes of ‘real’ building design and construction, must begin to understand the ‘real’ people who occupy or use buildings, every day of every week, in all parts of India … and that they each have widely differing ranges of human abilities and activity limitations. Just as they are different from each other, they will react differently than expected in a ‘real’ building fire emergency.

Based on a Keynote Presentation before International Council for Building Research (CIB) Working Commission 14 : Fire and Sub-Committee 3 & 4 Members of ISO Technical Committee 92 : Fire Safety, at Lund University in Sweden … and his fire safety texts which have been fully incorporated into International Standard ISO DIS 21542 on Accessibility-for-All, currently under development and due for publication before the end of 2010 … CJ Walsh’s Presentation, at the FSAI National Fire Seminar in Bengaluru, will focus on ‘Fire Safety, Protection & Evacuation for All’.

END

‘Areas of Rescue Assistance’ in Buildings – More Bytes ?

Posted 2009-03-17 by CJ Walsh

2009-03-17: Pull closer to the screen … we can lower the sound level, and be honest with ourselves for a few minutes …

We have enabling legislation spewing out of our ears in the European Union on the subject of ‘fire safety, protection and evacuation for all’ … there is absolutely no shortage whatsoever !

The problem is that far too many fire officers (prevention and operations) and building control officers in local authorities, architects, engineers and quantity surveyors do not know and/or do not care about this issue.

Rates of compliance with legislation are very low. Proper compliance is such a rare thing … that you would almost feel like holding a party, in celebration, right there on the spot when it’s discovered ! This applies not only to Ireland and Great Britain … but to the rest of Europe as well.

And while many countries have already signed and ratified the 2006 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which became an International Legal Instrument on 3rd May 2008 … and many more will do likewise during the course of the next year or two, including the United States of America (according to the Whitehouse WebSite !) … I am sure that few individuals in those countries have any understanding of Article 11 (text quoted in an earlier post).

Accessible Fire Engineering:

On that fateful morning of 11th September, 2001 … at the World Trade Center Complex in Lower Manhattan, New York City … we witnessed a catastrophic failure in common practices and procedures … at all levels …

– Architectural / Conventional (‘Ambient’) Engineering / Fire Engineering ;

– Building Management ;

– Emergency Responders / Firefighters / Rescue Teams ;

– Control Organizations Having Authority (AHJ’s) or Jurisdiction ;

– Fire Safety Objectives in Building Legislation, Codes & Standards.

This was a ‘real’ fire incident. It has been very, very closely examined in the intervening years. Disability was a major issue at the heart of the tragedy … 6% of WTC building occupants were people with mobility impairments … approximately 8%, in total, were people with disabilities. The overall number of People with Activity Limitations (2001 WHO ICF), however, was higher.

It is for this reason that three vital WTC Components have neatly dovetailed and fused … to realize an essential rational and empirical basis for a transformed fire engineering approach which can deal effectively with ‘fire safety, protection and evacuation for all’ of the people who use buildings … Accessible Fire Engineering … a subset of Sustainable Fire Engineering …

1. 2005 NIST(USA) NCSTAR 1 Final Report on 9-11 WTC 1 & 2 Tower Collapses.

2. 2008 NIST NCSTAR 1A Final Report on 9-11 WTC 7 Collapse.

3. Ongoing NYC-ATSDR World Trade Center Health Registry (established 2002).

Further Information about ‘fire safety, protection and evacuation for all’, the NIST 9-11 Reports and the WTC Health Registry … is available at the FireOx International WebSite …

www.fireox-international.eu

Picking up, therefore, where I left off a few days ago …

An ‘Area of Rescue Assistance’ in a Building should:

– adjoin every fire evacuation staircase in a building ;

– be located on every floor (note: fire evacuation routes at ground level should lead directly to the exterior) ;

– include adequate space for the people in wheelchairs, and their assistants, people using crutches, people with visual impairments, etc., who may be expected to use the area of rescue assistance during a fire emergency ;

– have good lighting at all times (note: lighting activation/de-activation by motion detection, for reasons of energy efficiency, should not be used in an area of rescue assistance) ;

– be clearly indicated with good signage ;

– be fitted with an accessible and reliable communication system placed at a height of 900 – 1 200 mm above finished floor level, facilitating direct contact with a person in the main fire and security control centre for the building ;

– be of sufficient size for the storage of a sufficient number of (powered) evacuation chairs, portable fire extinguishers, a fire hose reel and a manual fire alarm call point, a fire evacuation supply kit containing, for example, smoke hoods, suitable gloves to protect a person’s hands from debris when pushing his/her manual wheelchair, patch kits to repair flat tyres, and extra batteries for powered wheelchairs, etc.

The Size of an Area of Rescue Assistance should:

– relate to expected local usage during a fire emergency. When the number of people using/occupying/working in/visiting a specific building is considered … calculate how many may have to wait there, if the lifts/elevators cannot be used for evacuation and/or fire safety management procedures fail.

For example, if there are only two fire evacuation staircases on a floor in a building (on opposite sides of the building, of course), each area of rescue assistance should be designed to cater for the expected needs of the full floor.

Please also see the end of my Post: ‘U.S. Disability Statistics – EU Practical Application ?’, dated 2009-02-25.

Evacuation Chairs should be capable of:

– being safely and easily handled ;

– carrying people of large weight (up to 150 kg) ;

– going down staircases, which may be narrow and of unusual shape, particularly in existing buildings ;

– travelling long distances horizontally and externally, perhaps over rough ground, in order to reach a ‘place of safety’.

When it is necessary to go up an evacuation staircase to reach ground level … for example, from a basement or underground shopping centre … Powered Fire Evacuation Chairs should always be provided.

A ‘Reliable’ Buddy System:

In buildings with a reasonably stable user profile, e.g. workplaces, a Buddy System should be introduced throughout the building user population. For reliability and flexibility, e.g. to accommodate absence or holiday leave, a buddy system should always comprise at least 3 or 4 people.

In the case of a person using a wheelchair, his/her Buddy Unit should never be less than 4 people …

Black and white photograph showing the correct technique for assisting the evacuation of a person who uses a wheelchair. U.S. Fire Administration 'Orientation Manual for First Responders on the Evacuation of People with Disabilities'. FA-235/August 2002. — Black and white photograph showing the correct technique for assisting the evacuation of a person who uses a wheelchair. U.S. Fire Administration ‘Orientation Manual for First Responders on the Evacuation of People with Disabilities’. FA-235/August 2002.

Fire Safety Management Procedures:

Prior to putting any Management Procedures into operation … and certainly before carving any of these procedures in stone … meaningful consultation should take place with building users and local fire authorities … which, particularly in the case of people with activity limitations, will produce the desired outcome of informed consent.

Informed Consent …

Consent freely obtained – without threats or improper inducements – after appropriate disclosure to a person of relevant, adequate and easily assimilated information in a form (e.g. oral, written, braille) and language understood by that person.

Personal Representative …

A person charged, under European Union or EU Member State national law, with the duty of representing another person’s interests in any specified respect, or of exercising specified rights on that person’s behalf – and including the parent or legal guardian of a child, i.e. a person under the age of 18 years, unless otherwise provided for by European Union or EU Member State national law.

Without wishing to be obscure, or to avoid the issue … Fire Safety Management Procedures need to be developed to suit each specific building, with its own building user population.

END

Ar C.J. Walsh Technical Blog – Registered Architect, Fire Engineer & Independent Technical/Building Controller …… International Expert on Accessibility (incl. Fire Safety & Evacuation) for ALL + 'Real' Sustainability Implementation ! …… NO ADS & NO AI HERE !!

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